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Abstract
Much research has established reliable cross-population differences in motivations to invest in one’s in-group. We compare
two current historical-evolutionary hypotheses for this variation based on (1) effective large-scale institutions and (2)
pathogen threats by analyzing cross-national differences (N= 122) in in-group preferences measured in three ways. We find
that the effectiveness of government institutions correlates with favoring in-group members, even when controlling for
pathogen stress and world region, assessing reverse causality, and providing a check on endogeneity with an instrumental
variable analysis. Conversely, pathogen stress shows inconsistent associations with in-group favoritism when controlling for
government effectiveness. Moreover, pathogen stress shows little to no association with in-group favoritism within major
world regions whereas government effectiveness does. These results suggest that variation in in-group preferences across
contemporary nation-states is more consistent with a generalized response to institutions that meet basic needs rather than
an evolved response dedicated to pathogens.
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Introduction
The degree to which people prefer interacting with and
investing in family, friends, and in-group members–which we
label ‘‘in-group preferences’’–varies substantially across human
societies, and has been associated with a variety of population-level
cognitive differences [1–5]. For example, in one multi-country
study of hypothetical decision-making, the probability of lying to
help a friend over telling the truth in court varied between 5% and
70% [6]. Nevertheless, despite a large and expanding body of
findings showing reliable differences across populations, only
recently has research begun to develop and test historical-
evolutionary causal explanations for such differences.
Here we assess two current historical-evolutionary accounts for
this cross-cultural variation in in-group preferences, focused on the
effects of (1) large-scale uncertainty-reducing institutions, and (2)
pathogen threats.
The first material or existential security hypothesis proposes that
these population-level differences are responses to the existence of
social institutions that can buffer risk, ensure basic needs are met,
and mitigate threats to survival [7]. Like other animals who engage
in social niche construction, humans actively modify their social
environments as a means of adapting to material threats, including
pathogen stress [8,9], environmental extremes [10], food insecu-
rity [11], and inter-group conflict [12]. However, humans are
unique in their ability to construct their social environments
cumulatively over generations, with the cultural transmission of
social norms (e.g., food sharing), knowledge (e.g., germ theory of
disease), practices (e.g. food storage, charity), complex technologies
(e.g., boiling water, burying the dead) and formal institutions (e.g.,
courts, police, hospitals, health care, insurance and social safety
nets). In these culturally-constructed niches, humans face frequent
decisions about investing in one’s family or in-group vs. pursuing
other social investments, including cultivating new relationships in
a broader social network. Under different social and ecological
conditions, the same investments can have very different
consequences. For example, public services, global markets, and
social safety nets that mitigate material threats may render
investments in an expansive network of kith and kin less necessary
as alternative forms of social insurance. Moreover, limiting one9s
social interactions to local in-group members can prevent one
from accessing the benefits of trade and comparative advantage, of
expanded mating opportunities, and of new ideas and cultural
innovations. By contrast, in societies lacking such institutions,
where plagues, injuries, and economic shocks represent serious
and persistent threats, in-group members may be the only reliable
source of social insurance and support, and intensive investments
in enduring social relationships may serve as a crucial buffer
against threats to survival and reproduction [13–15]. The cultural
evolution of norms, know-how, technologies and institutions that
increasingly mitigate threats to material insecurity may create new
contexts which permit reallocations of investment away from in-
group relationships via several mechanisms [15–17]. These can
include facultative calculations of costs and benefits, learning over
the lifespan, genetic changes, and culturally acquired beliefs,
values, habits and motivations [10,18,19]. For example, a vast
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body of experimental work indicates that cuing uncertainty in a
number of domains, including mortality, disease, and social
exchange, makes people more likely to invest in cultivating
cooperative social ties and to favor in-group members [20–25].
Conversely, priming individuals with terms related to safety and
security make them less likely to favor in-group members [26].
This suggests that decisions about in-group and out-group
investment involve at least some facultative responses to the
current level of certainty and safety. These facultative responses
and the other mechanisms outlined above may contribute to the
extant patterns of variation in in-group investment. Some
researchers have also proposed an opposite causal pathway linking
in-group preferences and institutions. Specifically, lower levels of
in-group favoritism may foster economic growth and the
development of institutions that mitigate material threats [27].
In both cases, we would expect a correlation between institutional
quality and in-group favoritism.
The second account proposes that in-group preferences are a
form of behavioral immune system reflecting a cognitive
adaptation evolved specifically to protect against the spread of
pathogens. According to this hypothesis, in regions with high risk
of infection by dangerous pathogens, individuals will preferentially
affiliate with in-group members in a way that insulates them from
infection by out-group members [8,28–30]. Though originally
predicting xenophobia (negative out-group attitudes and behav-
iors), the theory has been extended to account for in-group
favoritism (positive in-group attitudes and behaviors) as well [30].
Depending on the specific treatment of this hypothesis, the
adaptive mechanisms may range from short-term cost-benefit
calculations to longer term changes due to cultural learning,
epigenetics, or even genetic adaptation [28]. Emerging experi-
mental evidence suggests that people do indeed adjust social
motivations and behaviors (i.e. conformism) to specific cues of
pathogen threats over and above generalized threats [31]. Broadly,
this hypothesis is subsumed by the material insecurity hypothesis,
which views pathogen threat as but one type of material insecurity.
However, this hypothesis differs crucially from the material
security hypothesis by positing that the adaptive mechanisms
responsible for this effect are specific to pathogen risk and were
designed to impede the spread of pathogens. In addition to
critiques of the theory9s key assumptions [32], scholars have
recently criticized cross-population tests of the pathogen stress
hypothesis for not considering alternative hypotheses [31,33] and
for not accounting for the non-independence of country-level data
[34].
Here we assess these two hypotheses using available cross-
national measures of in-group preferences. We focus our analyses
on three independent measures of in-group preferences used in the
literature. First, we use Hofstede’s measure of collectivism as one
of the first and most commonly deployed assessments of loyalty to
one’s in-group in cross-national analyses. Second, Van der Vliert’s
measure of in-group favoritism is a reliable between-country
measure of in-group favoritism which incorporates in-group
preferences at several social scales–including immediate family,
extended relatives, and country. Third, Fincher and Thornhill’s
measure of familism is a key variable in current studies of pathogen
stress. We also further validate these findings against five
additional measures of in-group favoritism–particularism, compa-
triotism, nepotism, familism, and embeddedness–in on-line File
S1. These measures include preferences for in-groups of varying
kinds and at differing social scales, from close friends and family to
members of the same country.
To analyze these measures we used a three-pronged approach
that goes beyond previous tests of the pathogen stress hypothesis.
First, using ordinary least squares regression, we assess the effect of
quality of basic government services (government effectiveness,
GE) and parasite stress on all three assessments of in-group
preferences, controlling for world region and dominant religious
tradition. As a confirmatory check, we also look for evidence of
reverse causality by which greater in-group favoritism might
weaken large-scale institutions [27,35,36]. Specifically, we assess
how our measures of in-group favoritism predict change in
government effectiveness from 1996 to 2009. This approach
further confirms that reverse causality is unlikely at least at
relatively short 13-year time scales, though such reverse causality
remains possible on larger time scales. Finally, we develop an
instrumental variable regression as an additional check on
selection and omitted variables in any observed relationship
between government effectiveness and in-group preferences
[37,38].
Overall, these analyses suggest that general material insecurity
in the face of weak institutions, not just a dedicated response to
pathogens, is an important determinant of in-group preferences.
Moreover, the instrumental variable analysis suggests a historical
explanation for the raw, unadjusted correlations observed between
pathogen stress and in-group favoritism.
Materials and Methods
In this section we first discuss our sample and then how we
measured preferences for in-group investment, institutional
quality, pathogen risk, and religion. Then, we lay out the analysis
and results.
Sample
The units of analysis are geopolitical regions, which are usually
formal countries (e.g. Italy), but also include regions defined by
political, economic and cultural history (e.g. Hong Kong).
Henceforth, we will refer to these units as ‘‘countries.’’ Countries
can contain substantial within-population heterogeneity in cultur-
al, religious and economic factors, but they also exhibit sufficient
between-population variation to support informative ecological
analyses [39]. The samples used in this paper differ depending on
the availability of outcome measures, with sample sizes listed
below.
Measuring In-Group Preferences
For each variable, higher values indicate stronger in-group
preferences. The derivation and description of these three in-
group preference measures, five additional in-group preference
measures, as well as predictor and control variables are described
in Table S1, Table S2, and Table S3 in File S1.
Hofstede’s collectivism (N=72). Collectivism is the ten-
dency to care about the consequences of one’s behavior for in-
group members and to sacrifice personal interests for collective
gains [2,40]. The extreme individualism that distinguishes many
western societies, by contrast, measures people’s lack of willingness
to differentiate an in-group and sacrifice for the collective good of
that in-group. We use Hofstede’s national measure of collectivism
assessed from the work attitudes of over 100,000 IBM employees.
Van der Vliert’s in-Group favoritism (N=121). Van der
Vliert [10] developed a scale of in-group favoritism from three
highly correlated international assessments of: (1) familism, (2)
nepotism, and (3) compatriotism (Cronbach’s a=0.89). Familism
is preferential concern for and investment in one’s closest relatives
(parents, children and siblings) assessed from middle managers
about how parents and children respect each other and live
together [41], and this specific measure has also been used in other
Institutions, Parasites and In-Group Preferences
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work as ‘‘in-group collectivism’’ [8]. Nepotism is favoring relatives
over non-relatives in the allocation of resources, and was measured
from a multi-country survey of business executives from nationally
representative samples of firms about the degree to which senior
management positions are chosen based either on superior
qualifications or on one’s kin relationship [42]. Compatriotism is
favoring members of one’s own nationality over others, and was
derived from questions in the World Values Survey (1999–2002
wave) about whether employers should give priority to compatriots
[43]. Additional analyses in the on-line file S1, confirm that the
general results for this composite variable also hold for each of the
three components.
Fincher and Thornhill’s strength of family ties
(N=71). In order to compare our results with recent findings
by Fincher and Thornhill about the pathogen stress hypothesis, we
use the measure of in-group preference–strength of family ties–
they use in a recent publication. Family investment is preferential
concern for and investment in one’s closest relatives (parents,
children and siblings). Fincher and Thornhill (2012) derived this
measure as the sum of five items in the 1981–2007 pooled dataset
of the World Values Survey about the value placed on immediate
family. Despite capturing different dimensions of in-group
preferences the three measures of in-group preference show
moderate to high correlations among themselves (collectivism-
favoritism r=0.70, collectivism-family ties r=0.65, favoritism-
family ties r=0.56, p,0.001).
Measuring Government Services and Pathogen Stress
Pathogen stress. Estimates of contemporary pathogen prev-
alence were used from Fincher and Thornhill (2012). To assess
F&T’s hypothesis about a dedicated psychological response to
human-to-human pathogens, we focus on their preferred measure
of non-zoonotic pathogens. In Table S4 in on-line file S1, we also
assess the hypothesis with a historical measure of pathogen stress
[9].
Quality of government services. To assess quality of
government services, we used the World Bank’s 1996 measure of
government effectiveness which indexes the quality of public and
civil services in a country, including roads, schools, hospitals, and
courts [44]. The on-line file S1 considers three other measures of
institutions and material security: GDP per capita, the Human
Development Index, and Food Stress (Table S5 in File S1).
Religion. To adjust for potential confounding effects of
shared religious background [45,46] [47], we use world religious
tradition with a plurality of adherents in a country as determined
by Inglehart and Norris (2004). The categories include Muslim,
Jewish, Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant, and Eastern (which
includes Hindu, Buddhist, Shinto and Confucian traditions). We
use Catholic as the reference category in regressions.
World region. To assess and adjust for potential confounding
effects of shared social, political, and cultural history as well as
shared genetic background, we use world regions defined by the
World Bank, including sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and
North Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Latin America and the
Caribbean, and Europe and Central Asia. We use Europe and
Central Asia as the reference category in regressions. Such controls
importantly assess whether observed associations could be due to
unmeasured similarities among nation-states based on shared
ecological, cultural, social or religious factors which are not
causally related to key predictors. If observed associations don’t
hold up under such controls, it is not possible to disentangle
whether the effect of pathogens or institutions is due directly to
these specific variables or rather to some underlying cultural or
regional similarity which effects both pathogens or institutions and
in-group favoritism. In short, including regional controls helps
address the problem of the non-independence of countries as data
points created by shared history, geography and proximity.
Without such controls, Germany and Austria are considered as
independent as Germany and Niger.
Additional control variables. We also assessed whether
bivariate associations and model estimates changed when includ-
ing a measure of income inequality in the models–the Gini
coefficient measure closest to 1996 [48]. There were no
substantive changes in effect sizes or inferences when including
the Gini coefficient, and to maintain the largest sample size, we
report results without Gini controls. We also assessed an
interaction between government services and temperature vari-
ability based on prior analyses suggesting that this interaction may
predict in-group favoritism [10].
Instrumental variable. Widely used in economics, an
instrumental variable regression helps identify what part of the
association between a predictor variable (X, government effec-
tiveness in this case) and an outcome (Y, in-group favoritism in this
case) is due to the direct effect of X on Y, rather than due to
reverse causality of Y on X or from other omitted variables. An
instrumental variable Z is a variable which is expected to cause the
predictor variable (X), but whose effect on Y is mediated via X. An
instrumental variable regression considers only the variation in X
predicted by Z, and examines how this variation predicts the
outcome Y. If a relationship between the variation in X predicted
by the instrumental variable and the outcome can be shown, this
contributes to establishing a causal relationship between X and Y
more than a standard multiple regression. Following work in
economics on historical determinants of economic growth [49,50],
we use the mortality rates of early settlers in European colonies
(1600–1875) as an instrumental variable which is expected to affect
contemporary government effectiveness. Acemoglu et al. provide
ample historical evidence that European colonizers avoided
settling in places with high mortality rates, such as in the Belgian
Congo. In lieu of settling, they set up extractive systems in these
places. In situations of low mortality, on the other hand, colonizers
settled in larger numbers and brought with them institutions, such
as respect of private property, checks and balances in government,
and equality of opportunity, which in turn fostered greater
government effectiveness that persisted even after independence
[49]. These measures of settler mortality allow us to identify what
portion of the variance in government institutions is due to early
(exogenously caused) settlement patterns. Given this reasoning and
the strong association between early settler mortality and
contemporary government effectiveness (r=20.54, N= 55), we
use settler mortality (1600–1875, [49,51]) as an instrumental
variable for the relationship between effectiveness of government
institutions and in-group preferences. More details on this
approach are provided in the online file S1.
Results
Here we present analyses of three measures of in-group
preferences using one measure of public services and one measure
of pathogen stress. Additional analyses of other measures of in-
group preferences, pathogen stress, and material security as well as
tests of potential interactions are presented in the on-line file S1.
In bivariate correlations with in-group preferences, both
government effectiveness (r=20.52, 20.68, 20.74, p,0.001)
and pathogen stress (r=0.58, 0.64, 0.37, p,0.001) were
significantly associated with all three measures of in-group
preferences–strength of family ties, collectivism, and in-group
favoritism, respectively (Figure 1). When including government
Institutions, Parasites and In-Group Preferences
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effectiveness and non-zoonotic pathogen stress together in a linear
regression predicting in-group favoritism, government effective-
ness remained significantly associated with all three primary
measures (and all five alternative measures) of in-group favoritism.
In the regression, pathogen stress showed less consistent associa-
tions with in-group favoritism measures. It was significantly
associated with only two of the three primary variables–
Collectivism and Strength of Family ties–and only two of the five
alternative measures–Nepotism and Embeddedness.
We fit regression models of each of the three measures of in-
group preferences on Government Effectiveness (GE) and
Pathogen Stress (PS) controlling for (1) world region alone and
(2) both world region and dominant religion. The standardized
regression coefficients in Table 1 show that after controlling for
shared regional background, GE is significantly related to
Collectivism (standardized beta =20.54, DR2 when adding
Collectivism to regional model = 0.17), Ingroup Favoritism (stan-
dardize beta =20.75, DR2=0.48), and Strength of Family Ties
(standardized beta =20.36, DR2= 0.13). This is consistent with
the five other measures of in-group measures in the on-line file S1.
No associations between in-group preference measures and non-
zoonotic pathogen prevalence remained significant after control-
ling for world region. In the on-line file S1, we show that historical
pathogen stress remains associated with one of the three primary
outcomes–Strength of Family Ties, p = 0.015–but not with any of
the other five variables included in the on-line file S1. Figure 2
graphically shows the relationship of the in-group preference
measures with GE and PS, when the impact of world region has
been removed. Within-region analyses of the association of
government effectiveness and pathogen stress with in-group
favoritism measures are consistent with these findings (see on-line
file S1).
After adding controls for dominant religion, GE remains
significantly related to Collectivism (DR2 when adding GE to
region+religion model = 0.03) and Ingroup Favoritism
(DR2=0.22), which is consistent with four other measures of in-
group measures modeled in on-line file S1, but not with Strength
of Family Ties. In all cases, adding dominant religion to the model
significantly reduces the independent variation accounted for by
GE. Importantly, collinearity statistics indicated no substantial
problems with collinearity in these models (all tolerances .0.20
and VIF,5).
In the full model including region, religion, government
effectiveness and parasite stress, a country’s predominant religion
accounted for additional variation in in-group preferences across
all measures of in-group preferences. Table 1 shows that, adjusting
for GE and PS variables, Protestant religion most consistently
affected in-group preferences. Countries with a plurality of
Protestants had lower average in-group preferences for all three
measures. In the full model, regions show less consistent
relationships with in-group favoritism, with East Asian and sub-
Saharan African countries showing significantly higher levels of
collectivism and strength of family ties, Latin American countries
show significantly higher levels of collectivism, and North African
and Middle Eastern countries show higher levels of in-group
favoritism (Tables S8 & S9 in File S1).
To assess whether the observed associations between the
effectiveness of government institutions and in-group preferences
are due to confounding or omitted variables, we conducted two
checks (full analyses available in on-line file S1).
For the first check, we estimated how well in-group preferences
predicted changes in GE from 1996 to 2009 as well as related
measures of GDP per capita from 1996 to 2009 and the UN
Human Development Index from 1995 to 2010, adjusting for
geographic region and dominant religion. The effects were either
non-significant or significant in the opposite direction expected by
an argument for reverse causality (Table S6 in File S1). Thus the
cross-sectional association between in-group preferences and these
measures is unlikely a result of in-group preferences leading to
higher levels of material insecurity or depressed economic growth
at least at a 13-year time scale. If anything, the opposite is true.
The second check involved an instrumental variables regression
and followed Acemoglu et al. [49] by using settler mortality during
colonization as an exogenous source of variation in later quality of
government institutions. We find that the estimates from the
original OLS regression are consistent with the estimates from the
instrumental variable regression, indicating that omitted variables
have not introduced substantial bias (Table S7 and Figures S1–S3
in File S1). In fact, for all three of our measures of in-group
favoritism, the IV coefficient estimates are larger in magnitude
than the OLS coefficients, and for Collectivism, they are
significantly larger in magnitude. This suggests that any endo-
geneity issues we have not modeled–if anything–likely suppress the
size of the observed relationship.
These findings are robust to a variety of checks and alternative
hypotheses. Tables in the on-line file S1 provide analyses parallel
to those shown above for all eight of the available measures of in-
group preferences, including individual analyses of the measures
that compose Van der Vliert’s In-Group Favoritism (Tables S8 &
S9 in File S1) and various measures of pathogen stress, including
both historical pathogen stress and zoonotic pathogen stress (Table
S4 in File S1). Tables S10 to S12 in File S1 show that including an
interaction term for GE and PS does not improve the model, that
including a term for Temperature Range and the interaction of
Temperature Range and GE does not improve the model, and
that historical pathogens do not confound the relationship between
GE and In-group Favoritism.
Discussion
Cross-national variation in in-group preferences or favoritism,
measured in three distinct ways, reveal a consistent relationship
between government effectiveness and in-group preferences.
Specifically, in societies where government services are less likely
to meet people’s basic needs, people invest preferentially in family
and in-group members. This finding remains for all three of our
in-group preferences measures when both pathogen stress and
world region are included in the analysis. The effect is robust
across alternative proxies for government effectiveness as well as
all five alternative measures of in-group favoritism considered in
the on-line file S1. These effects also remain for two of three
measures (and four of five supplementary measures) even after
removing global level variation in religious denomination. Finally,
these effects withstand checks on reverse causality and omitted
confounding and selection.
Contrary to a recent finding that specific psychological
responses to pathogens explain this cross-population variation
[8], there is no significant effect of non-zoonotic pathogen stress on
any of the three measures of in-group preferences (or the five
supplementary measures) after including controls for geography
and shared cultural history. Even when simply controlling for
government effectiveness, parasite stress only remains significantly
associated with four of the eight measures of in-group preferences.
Moreover, when these associations are significant, the coefficients
on pathogen stress predictor variables are no larger than other
material security measures. These findings indicate that pathogens
are inconsistently associated with measures of in-group favoritism
when controlling for government effectiveness, that significant
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associations may be due to confounding from other variables
which covary across major world regions, and that the effects of
pathogens are generally weaker than the effects of government
institutions. Taken together, these findings suggest that a
generalized response to social resources available to meet basic
needs (which may include buffers against disease threats) appears
the more plausible adaptive account for variation in in-group
preferences, than a response dedicated specifically to pathogens.
Figure 1. Three Measures of In-group Preferences by Government Effectiveness and Pathogen Stress.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063642.g001
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We also identified an independent contribution of shared
religious heritage to in-group preferences that accounted for a
substantial portion of the effect of institutions on in-group
preferences. A large part of this effect is carried by Protestantism,
and countries with a plurality of Protestant adherents have
significantly lower levels of in-group favoritism even after
Figure 2. Three Measures of In-group Preferences (residualized by world region) by Government Effectiveness and Pathogen
Stress.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063642.g002
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controlling for government effectiveness and world region. This is
consistent with Weber’s view that a key effect of Protestantism was
to ‘‘shatter the fetters’’ of extended family, and presumably other
kinds of in-groups [52]. Recent authors have pinned this on
Protestant core values of self-reliance and individualism which
potentially led to less investment in family, friends and local in-
groups [53,54]. The current data is not equipped to discriminate
between hypotheses for the role that dominant religion plays in the
relationship between institutions and in-group preferences, though
these findings are consistent with work suggesting that modern
religions have evolved culturally to expand the sphere of social
interaction, cooperation and exchange [55]. Taken together, these
findings suggest that both general processes of adaptation to
material insecurity, as well as particular historical contingencies or
trajectories, may play a role in shaping people’s in-group
preferences.
We argue that variation in institutional resources creates the
relevant social niche to which a variety of in-group preferences
may be a response. However humans also possess several different
mechanisms that permit adaptation at different time scales,
including immediate cost-benefit calculations, learning over the
life course, and cross-generational transmission [56–61]. The
current data is insufficient to discriminate between these different
pathways [28]. Some researchers have proposed that high
endemic pathogen load accounts for the observed link between
low institutional quality and in-group preferences by both: (1)
inhibiting economic growth and the development of public
services [62] and (2) spurring in-group favoritism. A related
argument proposes that high pathogen load leads to in-group
preferences, which in turn lead to weak institutions [63]. Two of
our findings suggest these proposals are unlikely. First, the effect of
pathogen prevalence on in-group favoritism generally does not
withstand simple controls for common regional and religious
background. This suggests that the second pathway is not well-
supported by existing cross-national data. Second, the effects of
other measures of material security on in-group preferences are
usually stronger than are pathogen stress, indicating that pathogen
stress is not a relevant confounder. A more plausible explanation
based on our analysis would place the causal role of pathogens (at
least among former European colonies) at much deeper time scales
[50]. Specifically, places with low pathogen stress led European
colonizers to settle and to forge effective institutions. In places with
high pathogen stress, colonizers set up extractive regimes with little
concern for fostering effective institutions. That is, pathogen stress
may have influenced the spread of effective, pluralistic, govern-
ment institutions, which in turn influences in-group favoritism (and
GDP per capita). Consistent with this hypothesis, government
effectiveness significantly mediates the effect of historical patho-
gens on seven of the eight measures of contemporary in-group
preferences (see on-line file S1). However, future studies that go
beyond cross-sectional, cross-national datasets will be necessary to
disentangle such potential interactions.
There are a number of limitations to our cross-sectional, cross-
national analyses. We are analyzing aggregate decisions based on
aggregate predictors, and it is possible that the associations do not
reflect between-individual differences in decisions and adapta-
tions–though other work suggests they do [58]. Second, since most
data was only available at single time points, it is difficult to sort
out the causal direction underlying observed associations. That
said, when longitudinal data was available, we have tried to assess
the possibility of reverse causation. Checks on reverse causation
suggest that greater in-group preferences at the national level are
not associated with reductions in government effectiveness over a
13-year period. Thus, there is little support for the claim that the
cross-sectional association results from in-group preferences
decreasing government effectiveness at least over the short run.
Third, our controls for shared culture–World Bank region and
dominant world religion–are admittedly coarse-grained. However,
they do help discriminate between the government effectiveness
and parasite stress hypotheses. Future work, will hopefully apply
more sophisticated checks on Galton’s problem or at least
determine that they are unnecessary. Fourth, the national level
Table 1. Regression models predicting 3 measures of in-group preference by government effectiveness, pathogen stress, and
dominant religion (Coefficients are standardized betas).
Collectivism Ingroup Favoritism Strength of Family Ties
N=72 N=121 N=71
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Government Effectiveness (GE) 20.47*** 20.52*** 2.031* 20.72*** 20.75*** 20.63*** 20.35* 20.36*** 2.08
Pathogen Stress (PS) 0.34* 20.01 20.06 0.03 0.05 20.01 0.45*** 0.14 0.13
Religion
Catholic – – –
Protestant 20.27** 20.33*** 20.33*
Orthodox 0.14 0.05 0.08
Islam 0.09 20.08 0.30*
Eastern 20.03 20.08 20.08
Jewish 0.02 20.09 –
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.66 0.72 0.53 0.57 0.64 0.43 0.53 0.63
DR2 from adding GE & PS – 0.17 0.03 – 0.48 0.22 – 0.13 0.00
*p,0.05,
**p,0.005,
***p,0.001.
Models 2 and 3 include regional controls. DR2 is the increase in adjusted R2 when adding Government Effectiveness and Pathogen Stress Base Model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063642.t001
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measures of in-group favoritism we use in this study tap into only
some aspects of in-group favoritism and are available for limited
samples of countries. Future analyses with measures that cover a
more representative sample of countries and examine in-group
favoritism at differing social scales and in different social situations
will provide important refinements of these analyses. Finally, with
observational studies there is always the problem of unmeasured
confounding. An instrumental variable analysis indicates that the
results are robust to omitted confounding or selection. We have
also examined two omnibus sources of confounding, world region
and dominant religious traditions, as well as economic inequality.
The first two capture geography, shared cultural history and other
effects, such as those associated with colonization and religious
assimilation. If alternative theories are proposed, it may be possible
to identify variables for assessing such confounding.
Here we have focused on only one kind of cultural niche
construction, how institutions, pathogens, economic growth and
technologies have shaped a variety of cultural and behavioral
responses toward in-group members. Humans also devote
considerable time and effort to investing in religious activities,
such as attending religious services and praying, which can be
framed as an investment in relationships with supernatural entities.
Interestingly, cross-national studies of religious investment–e.g.,
praying and attending services–indicate similar associations with
material security [43]. Strong secular institutions may create
cultural evolutionary pressures for different forms of religiosity or
spirituality. Future work that examines the influence of material
security on this and other kinds of social niche construction will
hopefully shed light on the nature and bounds of this association.
Supporting Information
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